



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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DJSM 624-84  
27 March 1984

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL  
SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: National Defense Stockpile Goals Review (U)

1. (U) Reference your memorandum\* requesting the Joint Staff review the subject reports.
2. (U) The Joint Staff has reviewed the two draft reports. We defer to OSD for any substantive inputs they might have regarding the economic theory used in developing the Foreign Stockpile Materials Supply and Demand Working Group Report (Task 9a).
3. (C) With respect to the Sealane Attrition report (Task 8), the Joint Staff concurs with the proposed attrition rates.
4. (C) We note, however, that neither the Political Reliability report (Task 3) nor the Sealane Attrition report addresses adequately the key issue of vulnerability of port facilities and inland distribution networks.
5. (C) Thus, we request that the Stockpile Steering Group include the proposed language (Enclosure) in the body of its final report (Task 11), thus insuring the National Defense Stockpile goals are computed after careful analysis of these vulnerabilities.

JCS review completed.

*YMC*  
GEORGE B. CRIST  
Major General, USMC  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

Reference:

- \* NSC memorandum, dated 20 March 1984, "National Defense Stockpile Goals Review"

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ENCLOSURE

VULNERABILITY OF PORT FACILITIES AND INLAND DISTRIBUTION  
NETWORK IN A GLOBAL CONFLICT (U)

1. (C) During war there is an effective loss of shipping due to situations that will dramatically slow down the process of transporting and distributing essential goods and raw materials. Deep sea cargo ships will spend much longer periods of time in ports due to many factors including the destruction of key infrastructure and inland distribution systems. Moreover, protective measures such as convoys and evasive routing will likely cause ships to spend longer times at sea. These measures also complicate port operations since ships in convoys arrive in port together and in large numbers.
2. (C) The shipping and distribution businesses are immensely complex. In time of global war, these businesses should not be left to manage their own affairs. The confusion that will arise on the outbreak of war coupled with the destruction of NATO ports would clearly degenerate into chaos if the United States and Allied Governments do not intervene. An efficient central administration would be needed to assure that the available resources were effectively used and shipped to appropriate places.
3. (C) While there are agencies chartered to manage cargo shipping in wartime, this study recognizes the extreme vulnerabilities to sabotage or direct attack associated with ports and inland distribution networks, both in CONUS as well as NATO.
4. (C) Thus, it cannot be assumed that existing ports and inland distribution systems of a country that have developed over the years to meet the demands of peace, can be easily or confidently transitioned to the demands of war.

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Enclosure

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